










The Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation (CHERE) was 
established in 1991.  CHERE is a centre of excellence in health economics and 
health services research. It is a joint Centre of the Faculties of Business 
and Nursing, Midwifery and Health at the University of Technology, Sydney, in 
collaboration with Central Sydney Area Health Service. It was established as a 
UTS Centre in February, 2002. The Centre aims to contribute to the development 
and application of health economics and health services research through 
research, teaching and policy support. CHERE’s research program encompasses 
both the theory and application of health economics. The main theoretical 
research theme pursues valuing benefits, including understanding what 
individuals value from health and health care, how such values should be 
measured, and exploring the social values attached to these benefits. The 
applied research  focuses on economic and the appraisal of new programs or new 
ways of delivering and/or funding services. CHERE’s teaching includes 
introducing clinicians, health services managers, public health professionals 
and others to health economic principles. Training programs aim to develop 
practical skills in health economics and health services research. Policy 
support is provided at all levels of the health care system by undertaking 
commissioned projects, through the provision of formal and informal advice as 
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This paper argues against the policy position that begins with a doomsday scenario of 
publicly provided health insurance and pension systems threatened with collapse under 
the stresses imposed by population ageing, and instead contends that the threat of crisis in 
these systems is policy driven. The central thesis of the paper is that a range of policies 
lead to the creation of an ageing crisis by inhibiting the efficient reallocation of female 
labour from the home to the market in response to the decline in fertility. The analysis 
focuses on family support policies that create large effective tax burdens on female labour 
supply, by means testing the support on family income, or selectively on the second 
income.  Examples include Family Tax Benefit Part A and Part B, the Medicare Levy and 
the Medicare Safety Net. The analysis draws on household survey data to show that 
female labour supply is strongly positively associated with household saving, the 
purchase of private health insurance and spending on family health generally.  Policies 
that inhibit female labour supply therefore have the effect of reducing the tax base for 
funding public pensions and health care, while simultaneously reducing the capacity of 
families to fund them privately.  
 
JEL: D19, H13, I18, J26 
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1 Introduction 
 
This paper examines the question of how to deal with the consequences of population 
ageing resulting from a large decline in fertility, coupled with significant advances in 
the technology of medical care, that Australia in common with all other developed 
countries has experienced over the last four or five decades. Population ageing 
necessarily increases the Aged Dependency Ratio (ADR), the number of retirees per 
person of working age, while the advances in medical technology, in making available 
major improvements in the scope and quality of medical care, have increased per 
capita health care costs. Since the aged have an above average demand for health 
services, the combined effect appears to be an increasing strain on the ability of the 
working generation to finance pensions and health services for the aged.  The 
Australian Government has produced two reports, Intergenerational Report 2002-03 
(IGR1) and Intergenerational Report 2007 (IGR2) that highlight the rising burden on 




The proposed solutions focus on privatisation. The policy response to the rising cost 
of pensions has centred on measures to increase contributions to superannuation, with 
the aim of partially replacing reliance on the non-contributory, income-tested Pay-As-
You-Go (PAYG) aged pension by private saving for retirement as the ADR rises. 
There has also been strong support for the expansion of private health insurance and 
private provision of hospital services. These solutions tend to be presented as self-
evidently essential, without discussion of the fundamental issues concerning insurance 
market failure, transactions costs and the social allocation of risk, that are important 
reasons for the existence of the publicly funded systems they are intended to replace. 
 
This paper first presents in Section 2 an alternative perspective on the economic 
effects of population ageing.  The remainder of the paper then argues that not only is 
the economic case for privatisation of pensions and the relevant insurance systems 
unsubstantiated, but there are alternative policies aimed at the system of income 
                                                 
1 See Australian Government (2002, 2007). 
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taxation and transfers that address the problem at its roots, and offer a more effective 
and less costly solution.   
 
2  Population ageing and dependency costs 
 
Though increasing longevity has been a contributing factor, the primary cause of the 
increasing ADR has been the large decline in fertility since the early 1960’s. In 1961 
the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Australia was 3.5.  By 1980 this had fallen to 1.9, 
and since that time it has tended to level out at 1.7 to 1.8.  It is projected to remain at 
around this level for the next 40 years.  IGR2 dramatically portrays the effects of this 
by pointing out that “In 2007 there are 5 people of working age to support every 
person aged 65 and over. By 2047, there will only be 2.4 people of working age 
supporting each person aged 65 and over”.  
 
Why might the drama be misplaced?   First, it is misleading to focus purely on the 
ADR when declining fertility is the major cause of population ageing. What is 
important is the Total Dependency Ratio (TDR), the ratio of the total non-working to 
the working age population. This is influenced by the child-to-working-age ratio, or 
Child Dependency Ratio (CDR), and of course declining fertility reduces this.  The 
TDR can therefore be falling as the ADR is rising.  This has in fact been the general 
trend since 1961. The projected levelling out of the fertility rate at its current level 
will cause the TDR to rise, with the result that the TDR will tend to exhibit a U-
shaped profile over the period from 1961 to 2047.  Since the minimum point in the 
profile is around the present time, a continuing rise in the TDR is projected for the 
next 40 years due, as stated in IGR2, to a fall in the traditional working age category 
(15-64 years of age) from its current 2007 level of 67.5 per cent of the total population 
to around 60 per cent by 2047, and a rise in the ADR that is greater in absolute value 
than the fall in the CDR. However, the projected TDR for 2047 is close to the rate for 
1961, which did not appear to cause the collapse of civilisation as we know it.
2   
 
                                                 
2 It should also be pointed out that with productivity growth in the historically experienced range of 
1%-2% per annum, over 40 years the average worker’s productivity increases by between 50%-120%, 
and so productivity growth alone can be expected to continue to make a significant contribution to 
raising output per capita. See Cutler et al. (1990). 
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Secondly, declining fertility and population ageing need not imply an increase in the 
resource costs associated with an increasing TDR. If the cost to the economy of a 
child is greater than that of a retiree, the overall costs of dependency can be falling 
even when the TDR is constant or rising, because of the changes in its composition. In 
developed economies children are very costly. All need full time care for at least some 
years and, depending on training and education choices, some may not enter the 
labour market for at least two decades.
3 On the other hand it might be argued that the 
health care costs associated with ageing and greater longevity make retirees more 
costly than children. Recent research in health economics however has shown that 
neither the direct nor indirect effects of ageing can account for much of the sustained 
rise in medical expenditure in recent decades.  A number of studies argue that the 
growth rates of health spending are driven primarily by rising per capita income.
4  
Others focus on the contribution of improvements in medical technology.
5  These take 
the form of innovations that increase the number and types of health problems capable 
of successful treatment, and so have the effect of increasing the demand for and costs 
of medical care. However, it is something of a paradox that technological innovations 
which offer the possibility of curing sickness and saving lives should be regarded as a 
problematic rather than beneficial development.
6 What may make them so is a failure 
of policy in the health care sector to solve the problem of structuring the health 
insurance system appropriately.  
 
Finally, and most fundamentally, the question arises of what happens to the resources 
released by the falling fertility rate. Dramatizing the gap (in terms of absolute values) 
between the ADR and CDR from the present time to 2047 is open to the objection that 
it distracts attention from the resource implications of the reverse relationship that 
held from 1961 to the present time. Given the evidence that, on average, a child is 
                                                 
3 This point is highlighted by Barro and Becker (1989). For an analysis using Australian data, see Apps 
and Rees (2002).   
4 See Hall and Jones (2007), Cutler and McClellan (2001) and Cutler et al. (2006). 
5 See Newhouse (1992).  The invention of new technologies may however be endogenous, as argued in 
Hall and Jones (2007). 
6 The view contrasts with the modelling of health expenditure as investment in human capital. Barro 
(1996) argues that medical advances have made an important contribution to sustaining a long-term 
positive growth rate.  See also Nordhaus (2003) and Becker et al (2005) who conclude that increases in 
longevity have contributed almost as much to welfare as increases in non-health consumption in the US 
and worldwide.  
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more costly than a retiree,
7 the period from 1961 to 2007 should have seen a 
significant rise in output per capita due to demographic change alone. Thus, the lower 
TDR over this period should have provided the resources necessary to offset any fall 
in output per capita up to 2047.  In other words, the period should have seen 
additional saving and higher tax receipts from a larger tax base as sources of finance 
for productivity-improving investments, such as in education, health and 
infrastructure. Provided the resources released by a declining fertility rate have been 
used for these purposes, there can be no reason to anticipate an “ageing crisis” with 
the leveling out of the fertility rate to 2047.
8   
 
The central thesis of this paper is that a range of government policies have led to the 
creation of a potential ageing crisis by inhibiting the efficient reallocation of female 
labour from the home to the market as fertility has declined.
9  Our analysis focuses on 
family support policies that create large effective tax burdens on female labour supply 
by means testing the support on family income, and on the second income. Examples 
include Family Tax Benefit Part A and Part B, the Medicare Levy and the Medicare 
Safety Net under which benefits depend on eligibility for Family Tax Benefit Part A.   
 
In the following section we show how policies of this kind, in combination with a 
poorly developed and costly childcare system, make it very difficult for married 
women to work in the market when they have young children. In Section 4 we go on 
to present evidence of a negative impact on female labour supply across the lifecycle.  
We then show that there is a strong positive relationship between female labour 
supply, household saving, the purchase of private health insurance and private 
spending on health generally. Thus, on the one hand the government provides 
subsidies to encourage saving for retirement and the purchase of private health 
insurance and, on the other, puts in place a tax and family support system that has 
strong negative effects on both.  The section provides a brief critique of these policies, 
and of the move towards privatisation.  A concluding comment is contained in Section 
5. 
                                                 
7 For an analysis of child costs in a lifecycle framework, see Apps and Rees (2003). 
8 If fertility rises significantly, then of course the cost of dependency per working-aged individual could 
rise significantly. 
9 It is also of interest to note that a number of studies argue that policies that have a negative effect on 
female labour also reduce fertility.  
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3  Taxes, family support and income tests 
 
Australia is widely viewed as having a progressive tax on individual incomes. 
However, the rate schedule of a country’s income tax system is set not solely by the 
schedule of rates applying to personal income but also by the design of income tests 
for benefits, exemptions, credits and offsets. The focus of the analysis here is on the 
high rates of tax faced by married women as second earners under a system of 
effective joint taxation, introduced by targeting the Medicare Levy (ML) exemption 
and Family Tax Benefit Part A (FTB-A) on the basis of joint income, and the 
withdrawal of Family Tax Benefit Part B (FTB-B) on the income of the second 
earner.  The Medicare Safety Net, which is linked to FTB-A, is also at fault. The 
section first explains the structure of tax rates created by these policy instruments 
based on hypothetical cases, and then goes on to present an empirical analysis of the 
impact on families using household survey data. 
 
3.1  Structures of tax rates 
 
We compare two hypothetical families, the first with one partner in full time work and 
the second with both partners in full time work, to show how the above policy 
measures set high rates on the income of a second earner. For convenience, we label 
the single-earner household “H1” and the two-earner household, “H2”.  Each 
household is assumed to have two children, one aged under 5 and the other under 13 
years, and to decide first on the primary earner’s labour supply and then to choose the 
labour supply of the second partner. The male partner is taken to be the primary 
earner.  All adults face the same gross wage and have zero non-labour incomes. Under 
these assumptions the two households have the same primary incomes, but the H1 
household has only half the joint income of the H2 household because the female 
partner in H1 has chosen to specialise in the home production of childcare and related 
services rather than in market work.   
 
Figure 1a plots the profile of marginal tax rates (MTRs) that apply to the income of 
the primary earner in each household when the 2006-07 schedule of MTRs on 
5  
personal income is combined with the Low Income Tax Offset (LITO). The LITO has 
the effect of raising the zero rated threshold of the personal income tax rate schedule 
from $6000 to $10,000 and the MTR on income from $25,001 to $40,000 from 30 
cents to 34 cents in the dollar.
 10  Because the tax base is still individual income and 
the partners in the H2 household earn the same incomes, the graph shows a single 
MTR profile for both partners in the H2 household.   
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Figure 1b plots the ATR profile.  Again, there is a single profile because the tax base 
is individual income.  Note, however, that both members of the H2 household pay tax, 
and so at any given level of primary income, the household pays twice as much tax as 
                                                 
10 The LITO is in fact an entirely redundant policy instrument that serves only to reduce the 
transparency of the true MTR schedule, with a rate of 34 cents in the dollar on incomes from $25,001 
to $40,000, depicted in Figure 1. 
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H1.  In effect, the H1 household avoids tax on a second income by having one parent 
working in untaxed home production rather than in taxed market work.
11   
 
Figures 2a and 2b show what happens when the ML and FTBs are included.  The 
MTR and ATR profiles change dramatically.  There is now a large gap between the 
MTR profiles for H1 and H2, created by higher marginal rates on the second income 
up to the point where the base rate of FTB-A has been entirely withdrawn on joint 
income.  In Figure 2b the resulting ATR on the income of the second earner, ATR2, is 
well above that on the income of the primary earner, and therefore on the income of 
the single-earner household, ATRH H1, up to around the upper income limit of 
$104,317 for the base rate of FTB-A, for H1.  As a result the ATR profile for the two-
earner household, ATRH H2, is well above that for the single-earner household, 
ATRH H1, up to this point.   
 
A gap of this kind between primary and second earner ATR profiles is a characteristic 
feature of joint taxation.  Under a system of full joint taxation or, equivalently, income 
splitting, the second earner faces on the first dollar earned the MTR on the primary 
earner’s last dollar.  And because she faces a higher MTR on every dollar she earns, 
she has a higher ATR.  The withdrawal of FTBs on joint income and the income of 
the second earner has the same effect up to the primary income level at which the H1 
household has entirely lost FTB-A.  
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11 If tax revenue is used to finance a universal benefit for each family, then, at any give level of primary 
income, the H2 household contributes more to the revenue cost of the benefit and therefore effectively 
finances a subsidy for the H1 household by working longer hours in the market. 
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The effective tax rate on the second earner at this income level can be even higher, 
due to the Medicare Safety Net thresholds.  For eligible services outside hospital, 
Medicare pays 80 per cent of the out-of-pocket (OOP) costs above a family threshold 
of $519.50.  For families not in receipt of FTB-A, the threshold rises to $1039.00.
12  
The second earner in the H2 household on $52,200, a figure slightly below average 
weekly earnings (AWE), can therefore lose an additional 80 per cent of the increment 
in the threshold, that is, of $519.50, depending on the family’s OOP costs.
13     
 
3.2  Impact on families 
 
We use data for a sample of 1945 “in-work” couple income units drawn from the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Income and Housing Survey (IHS) (2003-04)
14 
to examine the overall impact of the system on families. The sample is selected on the 
criteria that the couple income unit has dependent children and at least one parent is 
employed.  Families in which both parents are unemployed or out of the workforce 
are excluded in order to focus on the income tax and FTB system, rather than on the 
wider welfare system. This excludes very few records.
15  The sample is also limited to 
                                                 
12 These were the thresholds for 2006-07.   
13The findings of a study by Van Gool et al. (2006) indicate that the Medicare Safety Net my have led 
to an increase in provider fees.  This would result in further losses in the net income of families at this 
income level. 
14 Second edition. 
15 Of male partners in the full sample of families, 83.6 per cent are in full time work, 6.7 per cent are in 
part-time work and 2.5 per cent are unemployed.  27.9 per cent of married mothers are in full time 
employment.  37.6 per cent are in part time work and 2.3 per cent report being unemployed.  Only a 
quarter of one per cent of families reports both parents as unemployed. 
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families in which at least one parent earns above $15,000 per annum, earnings are 
principally from wages and salaries, and neither parent has a negative income from 
investments or unincorporated enterprises.  The parent with the higher private income 
is treated as the primary earner.
 16  The male partner is the primary earner in over 87 
per cent of records. All incomes are indexed to the 2006-07 financial year. 
 
Given the assumption that the household decides first on the primary earner’s labour 
supply and then chooses the labour supply of the second partner, the tax burden on the 
primary earner can be calculated as the tax the family would pay if it had only one 
earner, that is, if the second earner withdrew from work and therefore reported zero 
earnings. The burden on the second earner is then calculated as the increase in the 
family’s tax burden when her earnings are included in family income.  
 
The upper panel of Table 1 presents the results that would hold for all families if the 
second earner withdrew from work, by quintiles of primary income.  Row 1 reports 
data means for the incomes families would have under this assumption. The next row 
reports average family tax burdens as net tax, calculated as the sum of income taxes 
(including the LITO) and ML, less FTBs. The ATR in row 3 is calculated as the ratio 
of net tax to the average income that families would have with only the primary earner 
in work, expressed as a percentage. The lower panel of the table reports data means 
for second earnings, net tax calculated as the increment in the family’s tax burden due 
to the second earnings, and the resulting ATR on second earnings.  The final row of 
the table shows the average number of dependent children in each quintile. 
 
Table 1  In-work families: Tax burdens and rates, by primary income  
Quintile  1 2 3  4  5 All 
Primary income $pa  31004  43680  54445  67417  120055  63447 
All households as single-earner families        
1. Family  income $pa  31556  44759  55087  68775  123936  64958 
2. Net tax $pa  -7401  -1669  2929  8353  30760  6648 
3. ATR  %  -23.6  -3.7  5.3  12.1  24.8  10.3 
Additional tax on second earnings   
1. Second earnings $pa  11185  17809  20560  23344  22978  19159 
2. Net tax $pa  3871  6314  6538  7197  7425  6266 
3. ATR on second earnings %  34.6  35.4  31.8  30.8  32.3  32.7 
Number of dependent children  1.92  1.79  1.89  1.92  1.97  1.90 
                                                 
16 Private income is income from all non-government sources such as wages and salaries, profits, 
investment income and superannuation. See ABS (2005). 
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The average net tax on family incomes is $12,914, the sum of the amount that would 
be payable if the second earner worked at home, $6,648, and the additional net tax 
payable when she goes out to work, $6,266.  Thus, if all families had only one earner 
or, equivalently, if all second earners withdrew from market work, the average net tax 
per family in the sample would fall from $12,914 pa to $6,648 pa, that is, by over 48.5 
per cent.  The dramatic rise in the family’s tax burden when the second earner goes 
out to work is reflected in the very high ATRs on her earnings.   
 
The figure of $6,266 represents an average burden for all second earners.  It is very 
unequally distributed due to the diverse work decisions of married mothers. Only 29.7 
per cent of second earners are employed full time, 36.4 per cent are in part-time work, 
and the remainder, 33.9 per cent, are not in the work force.  As indicated in Table 2, 
much of the tax burden on second earners falls on the 29.7 per cent in full time (FT) 
work, and supporting close to the same average number of dependent children as all 
families in the full sample.  The average burden on second earners employed FT is 
$11,639, which is almost twice that of the overall average of $6,266 for the full 
sample.  Note also that families with a FT second earner are fairly evenly represented 
across quintiles, and so the results cannot be driven by primary earnings. While there 
are marginally more records in quintile 4 (see row 2), the overall mean of their 




Table 2  Second earner in full time work: tax burdens by primary income  
Quintiles   1 2  3  4 5  All 
1. Primary income $pa  31775  43758  54074  67583  107844  60022 
2. % second earner employed FT  25.4  34.6  32.2  30.8  25.6  29.7 
3. Second earnings $pa  20861 30771  35843  41886 47441 35351 
4. Tax on second earnings $a  7620  10509  11376  13536  15186  11639 
5. ATR on second earnings %  36.5  34.2  31.7  32.3  32.0  32.9 
Number of dependent children  1.70  1.69  1.63  1.72  1.82  1.71 
 
The highest ATR on second incomes, of 36.5 per cent, appears in quintile 1. This rate 
reflects large FTBs losses and, in addition, withdrawal of the ML exemption on joint 
income.  For example, a second earner in a family with a primary income near the 
                                                 
17 Note that asset incomes contribute very little to average family incomes across much of the 
distribution, and so primary income, shown in row 1 of Table 2, largely represents primary earnings. 
10  
quintile mean and two dependent children pays an additional $930 in tax because she 
not only has to pay the ML on her income but she also has to repay the exemption on 
the primary earner’s income.
18  In the case of a family in which both parents earn, 
say, $31,000 and have one child under 5 and another under 13 years, the second 
earner pays $4290 in income taxes, $930 ML and loses $7,867 in FTBs.  The total is 
$13,088, or 42.2 per cent of her income.    
 
Among those especially disadvantaged are two-earner families in which both parents 
work full time to earn around half the upper income limit of FTB-A, which is around 
AWE for a family with two children.  They pay twice as much in personal income 
taxes as the single-earner family also on AWE, and they are denied FTBs.   In 
addition, they can be disadvantaged by the Medicare Safety Net because rebates for 
OOP costs are dependent on eligibility for FTB-A.  
 
It is well established empirically that male labour supplies are not especially sensitive 
to tax rates, whereas female labour supplies are much more so.
19 Taxes and safety 
nets that reduce so significantly the net earnings of second earners across low and 
average wage households can therefore be expected to have a strong negative effect 
on female labour supply and, in turn, on the tax base and GDP.  The system therefore 
has the potential to create an ageing crisis by preventing the required reallocation of 
resources from home to market production with declining fertility and, as well, with 
technological change. 
 
4  Labour supply, saving and health costs 
 
Household survey data on hours of work indicate that Australia does not do well in 
comparison with a number of comparable OECD countries.  For example, in terms of 
hours worked by married women aged from 25 to 64, Australia ranks below the US 
and UK by over 10 percentage points, and below Sweden by over 20 percentage 
points.
20  Participation rates reported by the OECD for these countries in 2005 are 
                                                 
18 A primary income of $31,000 is below the lower joint income limit of $33,435 for the ML reduction 
for a family with two dependent children. The upper income limit is $39,335.  Because the ML 
reduction is withdrawn on joint income, it is partly a joint income tax, rather than simply a flat rate tax. 
19 For a survey, see Heckman (1993). 
20 For data sources and further details, see Apps and Rees (2005). 
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much closer - 64, 63, 66 and 72 per cent for Australia, the UK, US and Sweden, 
respectively.   However, female participation rates bear only a weak relationship to 
hours worked.  While almost all married men of prime working age in these countries 
work full time until close to retirement, there is wide variation in full time female 
rates of employment.  Australia has the lowest full time female rate across these 
countries and, as a result, the largest gender gap in market hours of work. 
  
This section first of all presents evidence on gender differences in lifecycle labour 
supply behaviour drawing on data for all couple income unit records in the ABS IHS 
2003-04. The sample contains 6953 records. The section then goes on to show that 
there is a strong positive relationship between female labour supply and household 
saving, purchase of private health insurance, and private health costs, using data for 
couple income units drawn from the ABS 2003-04 Household Expenditure Survey 
(HES) (2003-04)
21.  This second sample contains 4228 records. 
 
Female labour supply is strongly associated with the presence of children and 
therefore simultaneously with the tax treatment of married mothers as second earners.  
To capture the combined effects of both, we present lifecycle profiles of labour supply 
across six phases broadly defined as follows
22
Phase 1:   adult members do not yet have children
23
Phase 2:   household has children of preschool age 
Phase 3:   children are of primary school age 
Phase 4:   children are of high school age or have left school 
Phase 5:   adults are of working age but the children have left home 
Phase 6:  adults are retired, or over 55 and working part time 
 
Figure 3 plots the weighted data means of male and female hours in each phase.  The 
data show a dramatic fall, on average, in female market hours after the first child.  In 
phase 1 there is only a small gap, reflecting the fact that both partners tend to work 
full time before the arrival of children.  In phase 2 female labour supply falls to 
around a third of  
 
                                                 
21 Second edition. 
22 There are 782, 945, 1041, 1072, 1551, and 1562 records in phases 1 to 6, respectively.  
23  This phase includes all couples in which the female partner is aged under 40 years and there are no 
children present in the household.  
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male labour supply. Although female hours then tend to rise in the following working-
age  phases, they do not reach much above 50 per cent of male hours, even after the 
children have left home in phase 5.   
 
Time use data show that the sharp fall in female hours in phase 2 is associated with an 
even more dramatic rise in hours of domestic work, much of which is childcare.
24  
This suggests that, due to the demand for childcare, domestic work is a close 
substitute for market work in this phase. The data offer an explanation for why the 
labour supply elasticity of the female partner, typically on a lower wage, is found to 
be greater than that of the male partner, especially in a country with a poorly 
developed childcare sector.  When market and home childcare are close substitutes, 
and childcare is costly, tax rates on the income of married mothers at the levels 
indicated in the preceding section can be expected to induce labour supply responses 
that generate low female hours as depicted in Figure 3. 
 
The average profile for female labour supply in Figure 3 conceals the high degree of 
heterogeneity observed in female hours. The majority of married women work either 
                                                 
24 See Apps and Rees (2005).  Time use data for a number of countries, including the UK, US and 
Germany, as well as the 1997 ABS Time Use Survey data, show this.  
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full time or not at all.  If we select female records aged 25 to 59 years from the full 
sample of couples in the IHS, we find that 35.4 per cent are employed full time and 
30.1 per cent have zero hours. Thus, a total of 65.5 per cent are at the extremes of the 
distribution.  In contrast, the vast majority of males in the same age category, 83.6 per 
cent, are employed full time.  Since almost all married women in phase 1 are in full 
time work, this heterogeneity in female hours is driven by variation in hours across 
phases 2 to 5.  In these phases households tend to divide into two groups: those in 
which the female partner works few hours in the market or not at all, and those in 
which she works full time or relatively long part-time hours.   
 
We split the sample into these two groups within each of these phases.  The first 
group, labelled H1, represents households in which the female partner works below 
median female hours, and the second, H2, those in which she works above median 
hours. The separate labour supply profiles of the two groups, based on weighted data 
means, are plotted in Figure 4.  The figure shows graphically the very different work 
choices of married mothers in phase 2, and the persistence of heterogeneity in those 
choices until retirement in phase 6.     
 







































Partitioning the sample into lifecycle phases on the criteria outlined has the effect of 
controlling for the presence and age of children but not for family size.  If the H1 
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household has, on average, more children, the second earner may work fewer hours 
because of greater home childcare demands.  However, family size cannot be the main 
driver of the large gap in female hours because both household groups have close to 
the same average number of dependents within each phase: 2.03, 2.35 and 1.78 in the 
H1 household and 1.65, 2.16 and 1.67 in the H2 household, across phases 2, 3 and 4, 
respectively. An explanation can, however, be found in the structure of tax rates on 
the second income. 
 
With the arrival of the first child in phase 2, the female partner, as the lower wage 
parent, faces a choice between providing childcare at home and working in the market 
and buying-in childcare. If she works full time at home she avoids income taxes and 
the GST on her implicit income from, and expenditure on, home production and her 
family gains large FTBs. However, she loses work experience and may therefore face 
a lower wage later in the lifecycle, which has associated risks. On the other hand, if 
she goes out to work she faces very high tax rates, as well as high costs for bought-in 
childcare.
25 Because, as shown in the preceding section, taxes as a ratio of her gross 
earnings tend to fall with hours worked, she faces a non-convex budget set.  This can 
create a discontinuity in her labour supply function, with small differences in factors, 
such as perceived domestic productivity or the price of bought-in childcare, inducing 
large differences in labour supply choices in phase 2.  Panel data studies find that the 
time allocation decisions made at this time tend to persist over the lifecycle, even after 
the children have left home, as depicted in Figure 4.
26
 
We now examine household saving and health costs using the HES data sample.  
Again we partition the sample into the six lifecycle phases defined above. Saving is 
computed as total weekly household income less total expenditure excluding the 
                                                 
25 Time use data indicate she also faces a “time crunch”. On average, mothers of young children in full 
time employment work longer total hours – market plus domestic – than those who specialise in home 
production, and they work longer hours than their male partners. See Apps and Rees (2003). 
26 See, for example, Shaw (1994). The studies typically specify unobserved fixed effects, following 
Heckman (1981), to deal with unexplained heterogeneity.  For a survey see Blundell and MaCurdy 
(1999).  
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principal component of mortgage repayments, capital housing costs and 
superannuation and life insurance.
 27  
 
Figure 5 plots the lifecycle profiles of median saving for each household group, and 
the profile for the full sample.  The figure shows graphically the strong tendency for 
household saving to track female labour supply.  This is not a surprising, given that 
the H1 household has chosen to substitute domestic for market work and therefore has 
less market income available for the purpose of saving.  Median household saving by 
H1 households is well below that by H2 households from phase 2 to retirement.  In 
phase 1, median saving is high because almost all female partners work full time.  In 
phase 2 there is a sharp fall in the median of the full sample, due to a dramatic fall in 
the saving of H1.  The median saving of the H1 household is actually negative in 
phases 2 and 3.  
 






































Again the diverse decisions of the two household groups cannot be attributed to 
family size or, in this case, to the effects of family size on labour supply and therefore 
on earnings, for two reasons.  First, the household groups have close to the same 
                                                 
27 Note that total expenditure includes income tax and so saving is, in effect, computed as net income 
less consumption expenditure. 
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number of dependents, consistent with the data means for the larger IHS sample.
28  
Second, the gap between data means for saving is much larger than the gap between 
medians depicted in Figure 6.  Controlling for the effects of family size, lifecycle 
phase and the net income of each partner using regression analysis generates profiles 
that show a wider gap in household saving. The result is driven by a coefficient on the 
net income of the female partner that is around twice that on primary net income, 
indicating a much higher propensity to save from her net earnings.
29  An additional 
child is found to have a large negative effect, but because the two household groups 
have close to the same number of children, family size explains very little of the 
additional saving of the H2 household, evaluated at data means.  A formal model of 
the joint determination of female labour supply and household saving over the 




Similar results are obtained for lifecycle spending on health and insurance across the 
child-rearing phases.  The profiles of private health insurance are depicted in Figures 
6a and 6b.  Figure 6a plots the percentage of households in each group, and in the full 
sample, that purchase private insurance to cover hospital, medical and dental costs.  
Figure 6b plots the corresponding data means for fees incurred by each group, and by 
the full sample.  The H1 and H2 profiles in both figures show a strong tendency to 
track female labour supply in the early child-rearing years.  Only 45.0 per cent of H1 
households in phase 2 and 40.1 per cent in phase 3 purchase private health insurance 
cover for hospital, medical and dental costs.  The figures for the H2 household are 
63.1 per cent in phase 2 and 60.5 per cent in phase 3.     
 
                                                 
28 For the smaller HES sample, data means for the number of children are: 1.98, 2.41 and 1.87 for the 
H1 household and 1.61, 2.20 and 1.63 for the H2 household, respectively. 
29 The result was found to hold across a wide range of model specifications.  The models were 
estimated on a sample that excluded the bottom five per cent of male net incomes, negative female 
incomes, and the top 1 per cent of male and female net incomes, to remove the effect of outliers.     
30 An essential feature of the model is that it takes account of the presence of two-adults in the 
household.  Much of the literature on saving behaviour treats the household as a single decision unit.  
See, for example, Blundell et al. (1994) and the survey by Browning et al. (1996).  In models of this 
kind high wage H1 households are confused with much lower wage H2 households because, in effect, 
the models fail to control for wage rates. The studies therefore miss the strong positive association 
between female labour supply and household saving at a given wage level. 
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The lifecycle demand for health insurance is, in contrast to female labour supply and 
household saving, complicated by the rise in health risk with age.  Average female 
hours are at their highest level in phase 1 of the lifecycle, however the health risk of 
the household is at its lowest point in this phase, and so the demand for health 
insurance is low in phase 1. In the later phases, the profiles for private health 
insurance tend to converge, with both rising significantly with age, as we would 
expect. Although rising health risk is obviously an important determinant of the shape 
of the profiles over the lifecycle, nevertheless it is evident that households with a 
higher female labour supply are more likely to purchase private insurance and to 












































                                                 
31 This is consistent with the finding of Doiron et al. (2007) that personal income effects are stronger 
than other household income on the purchase of private health insurance, and that the effects of 
personal income are stronger for women than for men. 
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The H2 household also typically spends more on health overall, as we would expect, 
given the preceding results.  Figure 7 plots the lifecycle profiles of median household 
expenditure on medical care and health expenses.  The profiles tend to match those for 
female labour supply up to the pre-retirement phase, where the medians for both 
household groups tend to converge.   
 
 



























































These results suggest that household decisions concerning labour supply, household 
saving and private heath insurance cover, and spending on health overall, are made 
simultaneously, and in response to net of tax wage rates as well as interest rates and 
insurance premiums.  Tax policies that create strong disincentives for female labour 
supply can therefore be expected to have strong negative effects on saving and private 
health spending.  The same policies also contract the tax base, by reducing female 
labour supply. A reduced tax base will make the higher level of tax revenues required 
for funding family support, pensions and health less sustainable, while also limiting 
the ability of families to fund health costs privately.  
 
In the light of this evidence, it is something of a contradiction for government to 
provide, on the one hand, tax subsidies to encourage saving for retirement and the 
purchase of private health insurance and, on the other, to put in place a family tax and 
support system that sharply reduces both, by inhibiting female labour supply.  The 
policies, when examined jointly, can be seen to make very little sense as a response to 
a rising ADR.   
 
Moreover, as stand alone policies, tax subsidies for superannuation and private health 
insurance are open to objections that are well established in the economics literature.  
In the first instance, it has been known since Samuelson's (1958) classic paper on 
overlapping generations economies that switching from a PAYG to a funded pension 
system cannot, per se, lead to an efficiency gain.  There is now a large body of 
research that draws on the Samuelson model to show that the switch to a fully funded 
scheme cannot be a solution to the problems raised by declining fertility and 
increasing ADRs.
32  A key effect of the policy change is to require the present 
working generation to pay twice – they must save for their own retirement while 
continuing to pay taxes that finance the pensions of the currently retired. This double 
burden is especially problematic for working married women who are already 
contributing disproportionately to government revenues under the present tax system. 
 
The approach also fails to address the problem of insurance cover for longevity risk, 
                                                 
32 The studies include Breyer (1989), Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes (1998), Chand and Jaeger 
(1996) and Orszag and Stiglitz (1999) among others. For a discussion in the Australian context, see 
Apps and Rees (2002). 
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which is known to be notoriously badly handled by private annuity markets due to 
adverse selection, and which cannot be dealt with simply by increasing total saving. 
Individual insurance buyers are much better informed about factors such as their 
state of health, previous and current life style, and family health history that 
determine their risk class in terms of whether they have a high or low probability of 
a relatively short life.  The private market solution to the adverse selection problem 
involves restricted coverage to good risks, which represents the market failure.  It 
can be shown that an insurance system that pools all risks by giving everyone the 
same coverage and the same rate of return, in such a way that the scheme breaks 
even actuarially, involves no market failure, but does represent a redistribution of 
income from good to bad risks.  For this reason it cannot be sustained as equilibrium 
on a private annuities market: sellers could always find profitable contracts that 
would bid good risks away from the pooled contract. However, a publicly operated 
pension system does not allow such separation of risk types – it enforces pooling.
33
 
Similar arguments apply to health insurance markets, defined broadly to include not 
only those that provide coverage for health care costs, but also those that insure 
against loss of income and income-earning possibilities due to ill health and 
invalidity. Again adverse selection problems arise in such markets.  There are also 
serious problems of market failure due to asymmetric information that arise out of 
moral hazard on health insurance markets.
34 Such problems arise in both public and 
private health insurance systems, but there appears to be no evidence to suggest that 
privatization of public systems actually reduces the welfare losses due to these 





This paper has argued against the policy position that begins with a doomsday 
scenario of publicly provided health insurance and pension systems threatened with 
                                                 
33  Rees and Apps (2006) show that this is a better outcome than the market outcome, and would be 
preferred by any policy maker who is (at least weakly) averse to inequality in levels of welfare among 
individuals.  
34 For a general discussion, see Newhouse (1992). 
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collapse under the stresses imposed by population ageing, and  ends by proposing 
privatization of these systems, for example by moving to fully-funded pension 
schemes, as a solution to these problems.  Population ageing caused by declining 
fertility should be accompanied by a reallocation of resources from the household to 
the market sector, which would expand the flow of real output and the tax base 
available to meet the changed pattern of demand for goods and services arising out 
of the demographic changes. However, up until now, the effect of family tax and 
safety net systems has been to place such heavy incremental burdens on working 
women as second earners, that this necessary resource allocation has not taken place. 
Thus the threat of crisis is policy driven, and can be eliminated by making the 
appropriate changes in tax and family support policies.
35  
 
The case for privatising pension systems and health insurance markets, when 
considered on its own merits, is widely rejected in the literature.  Funding cannot 
make anyone better off without making others worse off, contrary to the impression 
that its advocates seek to give. Indeed, because of the higher administrative and 
transactions costs associated with it, it has the potential to make everyone worse off, 
though obviously it can be structured in such a way that some gain at the greater 
expense of others. Experience suggests that the pattern of gains and losses would be 
regressive. Health insurance markets notoriously suffer from problems of market 
failure associated with information asymmetries. These also present problems to the 
design of public systems, but repeating the mantra of privatization does not represent 
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